an article by Phin Upham

In the final days of World War II, February 1945, the Big Three allies – Franklin Roosevelt (US), Joseph Stalin (USSR), and Winston Churchill (U.K.) met in Yalta, in a former Tsarist palace on the Black Sea in the Soviet Crimea.  Each man had his own perceptions and goals.  Roosevelt failed to see Stalin and the Soviet Union as a post-war enemy resolutely hostile to Western free market democratic nations.  Certain agreements made at Yalta had a damaging effect on Central Europe and the post-war world.

At Yalta Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin had different concerns.  Churchill was wary of Stalin and of communism and envisioned an Anglo-American alliance against Soviet aggression.  The history  of Anglo-American friendship and the similarity of tradition and government reinforced this expectation.  Churchill wanted to guarantee free elections in Poland and Central Europe and to define Poland’s Western border, because the “Soviet menace … had replace the Nazi foe.”[1] Nevertheless, even Churchill’s policies toward Stalin and toward the Soviet threat to the post-war world were inconsistent and uncertain.[2]

Stalin’s most important goal was dominance of Eastern Europe.[3]

Roosevelt was the most powerful of the Big Three, but his goals were the least clear.  He wanted the Soviets to finish the war in Germany and Central Europe and to enter the war with Japan in order to save American lives, and he wanted his four policemen peace plan for the post-war world – Great Britain, The Soviet Union, The United States and China cooperating to police the world.  For these goals Roosevelt was willing to sacrifice Poland, Central Europe and parts of the Far East to Soviet expansion.[4] Roosevelt ignored the post-war menace of Soviet expansionism although there were many advisors who saw the post-war danger, and many events which demonstrated the aggressiveness  and untrustworthiness of the Soviets.

The Soviet-Nazi pact to divide up Central Europe and the Soviet invasion of Poland and the invasion and bombing of Finland were clear and abundant demonstrations of Stalin’s post-war intentions.  In 1943 it was found that the Soviets had murdered 10,000 Polish army officers at Katyn forest in Poland in order to prepare for the intended Soviet domination of Poland. [5] During the Warsaw uprising the Soviet army waiting outside the city was instructed by Stalin to stall Soviet  promised aid in the uprising against the Germans so that these people who were demonstrating the will and ability to rise up would be killed and therefore pose less threat to the Soviets in  Poland after the war.  The calculating and ruthless nature of those strategies to dominate Central Europe was plenty of warning of the serious post-war Soviet threat.[6]

For both Churchill and Roosevelt the certainty and the terrible consequences of Russian domination of Central Europe were foreseeable – “It was as certain as the sun’s rising that Stalin would insist on Communist dictatorships controlled by Moscow (in Eastern Europe).  The economic and political leaders of the old regime – landlords and factory owners, generals and aristocrats – would be thrown out, along with religious leaders and editors.  With them would go some of the most cherished concepts in the West – freedom of speech, free elections, freedom of religion, and free enterprise.  The men who ran the American government could not look with approval on the suppression of precisely those liberties they had fought Hitler to uphold.”[7] Nevertheless, Roosevelt was more interested in his four policemen plan and more given to his taste for “personal diplomacy” than in the ideologies and dangers of the communist Soviets.[8] At Teheran Roosevelt met privately with Stalin excluding Churchill to discuss his post-war world of the Four Policemen.  He told Stalin he had in mind that Britain and Russia would have to supply the land armies and the U.S. only planes and ships in a crisis in Europe.  “Stalin must have been delighted to learn that Roosevelt planned to permit the Russian and British armies to dominate the continent after the war.”[9]

At Yalta the major topics on the agenda were German reparations, occupation of Germany, the boundaries and government of Poland, the form of the governments of Central Europe that had been conquered by the Nazis, concessions to the Soviets in the Far East for the Soviet entrance into the war against Japan and the structure of the future United Nations.[10]

Of the agreements made at the Yalta Conference the most important were the agreements not made.  The Western boundary of Poland, guarantees of free elections in Poland and the rest of Central Europe were undefined – giving a free hand to Stalin to pursue his expansionist policy.[11] The Soviets were free “… to move Poland’s Western borders all the way to the Oder-Neisse line, taking not only East Prussia and all of Silesia but also Pomerania, back to and including Stettin.  From six to nine million Germans would have to be evicted.[12]

At Yalta the U.S. did not reconsider its insistence of Japan’s unconditional surrender, although that stance originally was taken up by Roosevelt to please Stalin, to reassure Stalin of U.S. friendship, (“… but deep-rooted Russian suspicions about American political intentions for liberated Europe increased.  At the conclusion of the Casablanca conference in January 1943. Roosevelt tried to allay them.  He announced that the allied policy toward Germany and Japan – and by implication toward Italy- would be to demand unconditional surrender.“)[13] Willingness to negotiate with the Japanese from overwhelming strength would have relieved the U.S. of any consideration of concessions to the Soviets.  Roosevelt chose instead to compromise not only Central Europe but also to compromise the Far East.  The Soviets agreed to enter the war against Japan within three months after the surrender of Germany.  In return for this the areas in the Far East given to the Soviets were Outer Mongolia, Manchuria, The Kurile Islands and half of Sakalin Island and the occupation zone in Korea (the future North Korea).[14] At Yalta “The Americans pressed Stalin to promise to enter the Pacific war and offered to force Chiang to make concessions to the Russians on the Sino-Soviet border in return.“[15]

It was agreed at Yalta that the UN should have a Security Council of the five big powers (England, The Soviet Union, The United States, France, and China) as permanent members with veto, and with a General Assembly of all big and small nations and two extra seats for the Soviet Union.[16] It was agreed that Germany would be divided into occupation zones.  Churchill wanted France to receive an occupation zone in Germany and Stalin insisted that it come only out of territory zoned for the two Western Allies.[17] Stalin was anxious about reparations from Germany and the Allies agreed to the Soviets receiving half the payments.  Twenty billion dollars was the amount accepted as an approximate number.  Berlin was also divided into occupation zones.

The decisions and the refusal of Roosevelt to make certain decisions at Yalta damaged Central Europe and the post-war world.  “In the long run, the President’s reluctance to agree to a Western boundary proved unfortunate.  After the war, the Soviets simply turned over all the territory extending to the Western Neissa to Poland, driving out over six million Germans.  If Roosevelt had been willing to commit himself to a specific Western boundary for Poland, he might have limited post-war Soviet influence in Central Europe.”[18] By refusing to make clear policy and by giving way to Stalin, Roosevelt allowed the oppression of millions of people in Central Europe and endangered the Western  World for 45 years.  “The Russians accepted the Yalta agreement as a veiled American surrender of Poland to the Soviets.”[19] Roosevelt should have valued Central Europe more.  The importance of Central Europe as a buffer between Europe and the Soviets was even recognized, although misconceived,  in 1919  ” … when President Woodrow Wilson took the lead in breaking up  the Austro-Hungarian Empire and established independent Western-oriented governments designed, in part to hold the Soviet Union in check.”[20] The loose confederation of the lightly governed Austro-Hungarian Empire might have proved a better buffer than the so-called self-determination  of oddly defined nations which were created in Central Europe after World War I.
Soon after Yalta Stalin refused to permit free elections in Poland or any reorganization of the Soviet puppet government of Poland or any representation of the Polish government in exile.  Stalin suppressed freedom of speech, press, religion, and assembly in Poland and in the rest of Central Europe and in Eastern Germany.[21] Central Europe and Eastern Germany were taken into the Soviet Orbit and the Western democratic nations were stonewalled.

There were many many times when Roosevelt refused to consider the post-war threat of the Soviets.  When the Nazis were about to break the Nazi-soviet pact and attack Russia the U.S. State Department warned Roosevelt against any ties with the soviets and advised that ” … no concessions be given to the Soviets without reciprocal advantages for the United States ... .”[22] The Soviet Union was not ” ... defending struggling for, adhering to the principles in international relations which we are supporting.”[23] In 1944 when the Soviets using lend-lease materials from the United States had driven the Germans out of Russia and were pursuing them across Central Europe,  George Kenon urgently advised a “‘ ... full-fledged and realistic political showdown with the Soviet leaders to ensure a free Central Europe or … forfeiting Western allied support and sponsorship for the remaining phases of their war effort.’”[24] This advice was ignored and Lend-Lease was continued with no concessions demanded.[25] That Lend-Lease policy should have been discontinued when the Nazis were driven by the Soviets to the borders of Russia.  Thereafter General Montgomery (British) proposed entering Germany in a single thrust to Berlin rather than a broad-front offensive.  Churchill supported this strategy ” ... mainly because he wanted the Anglo-American as far East as possible when they linked up with the Red Army … to forestall  Russian advance into Central Europe by an Allied (Anglo-American) liberation of Berlin, Prague, and Vienna.”[26] Roosevelt refused to consider this political-military strategy.   Also Churchill wanted to invade Europe through Yugoslavia and Austria and on into the Balkans and Central Europe.  But , “The possibility of the Soviet Union’s post-war expansion into  the Balkans or Central Europe did not seem to the Americans to justify a diversion from Germany.”[27]

Insistence at Yalta on the unconditional surrender of Japan led to concessions to Stalin of Japanese possessions and China-Soviet border concessions and contributed to the Yalta concessions on Poland and Central Europe.  ” America knew that the Japanese were trying to find a way out with honor.”[28] The Americans had already decided to let the Emperor stay but would not tell Japan  partially out of obdurate spite.  The Japanese perhaps would have surrendered given the Emperor and a guarantee of eventual self-rule, but the United States insisted on unconditional surrender which resulted in concessions to the Soviets for their participation instead of restraint of the Soviets in Central Europe and the Far East.[29]

Roosevelt disregarded the threat of Soviet ideology and aggression which he should have put down at every turn during the war.  At Yalta the U.S. had all the cards and could have used them.  A definition of Poland’s Western boundary would have limited Soviet dominance in Eastern Europe.[30] Churchill’s efforts at Yalta for international supervision  of Polish free elections[31] might have helped, but Roosevelt refused to insist on them.

Roosevelt on-goingly refused to consider the danger of Soviet expansion although America’s power made that refusal of great consequence.  “American domination of the alliance reflected, in turn, a new era in world history.  The united States had replaced Great Britain as the dominant world power.  By 1945 American production had reached levels what were scarcely believable.  The United States was producing 45 percent of the world’s arms and nearly 50 percent of the world’s goods.  Two thirds of all the ships afloat were American built.  These issues were especially important.  What to do in the Mediterranean, what form the advance into Germany should take, and whether the objective should be Berlin or the German Army.  On all three issues the Americans had their way.  American preponderance in the allied camp had become so great that, if necessary, the Americans could insist upon their judgement.“[32] If Western strategies during the war had included a cogent political strategy to deal with the post-war Soviet threat, then the liberation of Europe and Central Europe and the concessions in the Far East would have taken a different course.  Such a strategy could have eliminated or limited the Soviet gains in Poland and the rest of Central Europe and the Far East.  A knowing and purposeful political strategy dealing with the Soviet threat would also have set aside the four policemen notion unrealistically cherished  by Roosevelt, and removed any reasons to avoid displeasing Stalin or any eagerness to please him.

Soon after Yalta the Allies won the war.  Soon after the war was won a cold war began with the Soviet Union because of the unacceptable dominance of the Soviets in Poland and Central Europe and the obviously expansionist policy of the Soviet Union.  A policy of containment was then developed to limit Soviet world ambitions.  The decisions at Yalta, essentially Roosevelt’s, had led to Soviet dominance in Central Europe and to the Cold War.  The containment strategy and the Cold War might have been unnecessary or at a greater advantage and fewer people would have been doomed to suffer under Soviet oppression if the Yalta decisions had been thought through.  The Iron Curtain might not have darkened Central Europe.

The “Won the War but Lost the Peace” viewpoint is summarized by Larrabee in Commander in Chief: “Stalin succeeded in obtaining from Roosevelt and Churchill what he had failed to obtain from Hitler; namely Russia’s position as the dominant power on the Continent …” due to Roosevelt’s  ” … disinclination to annoy the Russians … the end result was the destruction of the European balance of power which Britain went to war to maintain.”[33]

Yalta Bibliography

Ambrose, Stephan E. Rise of Globalism, Penguin Books, NY.

Divine, Robert, Roosevelt  and World War II, 1990 London.

Graham and Wander, editors, Franklin Roosevelt 1985 G. K. Hall, Boston.

Larrabee, Eric, Commander in Chief, Harper and Roe 1987 NY.

About the Author

Phin Upham is an investor who lives in NYC and San Francisco.  He has studied at Harvard University and Wharton Business School (UPenn) and is a term member of the Council on Foreign Relations.